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The underlying premise of the urban transportation planning process is that we 
can forecast the future. The process typically develops 20-year forecasts of traffic 
volumes on each link of the transportation network. Planners then attempt to devise a 
master plan that represents an optimal solution for the forecasted conditions. The 
reality is that we cannot predict the future. Imponderable and unpredictable events 
will shape the future in ways we cannot hope to anticipate. In addition, social and 
political bias is a strong contributor to errors in anticipating future events and to our 
willingness to deal with uncertainty. This paper identifies possible remedies for deal-
ing with uncertainty and bias, including better analytical methods, better process 
methods, and methods to counter bias. An evaluation of various remedies is performed 
and practical measures that can be applied to the urban transportation planning pro-
cess are identified. Finally, specific recommended modifications to the urban trans-
portation planning process are outlined. 
A World of Change, Uncertainty, and Bias 
"It's tough to tell the future." 
So begins a report distributed by the Florida Department of Transportation 
(1994) as background for the 2020 Florida Transportation Plan. It goes on to 
note: 
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Analyzing historical and cw-rent trends to forecast conditions 20 
or more years into the future has been compared to throwing darts 
at a moving board under a strobe light. The dynamic nature of 
social, economic, and political activities in the United States and 
Florida creates too many uncertainties for foolproof orecasting. 
Twenty-five years earlier, Manheim ( 1979) noted, "We live in a world of 
rapid change." He identified three dimensions of change that are relevant to 
transportation systems: change in demand, change in technology, and change in 
values. We might also note a world of uncertainty-not only is change occur-
ring, but it is occurring in ways that we cannot anticipate. Others have cited the 
uncertainty in future availability of resources (Neumann and Pecknold 1973) 
and in estimating costs (Wachs 1986; Pickrell 1990). 
In addition to the objective fact of our inability to accurately predict the 
future, a major feature of urban transportation planning is the social and political 
bias that is evident in technical analyses. Recognition of uncertainty is routinely 
suppressed, bold assertions are made about future conditions, and forecasts are 
intentionally manipulated to promote politically-motivated conclusions. These 
features are particularly evident in the planning of large-scale transit guideway 
investments. 
The Urban Transportation Planning Technical Process 
Planning for urban transportation systems involves the application and analy-
sis of technically complex simulation models within a highly political 
decisionmaking environment. The conventional process involves development 
of 20-year forecasts of socio-economic variables, such as population and em-
ployment,. disaggregated into hundreds of traffic analysis zones of the typical 
metropolitan area. Based on the 20-year socio-economic forecasts, a series of 
sequential models are used to develop detailed forecasts of demands on the fu-
ture transportation etwork. 
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Reality: Change Cannot Be Predicted with Certainty 
The underlying premise of the urban transportation planning process is that 
we can forecast the future. The reality is that the models are highly imprecise, the 
inputs to the models are impossible to predict, and the forecasted results are 
almost sure to miss the mark. 
Sources of Uncertainty in Transportation Planning Models 
Lowe and Richards ( 1983) identified three sources of error in transporta-
tion planning models: specification, calibration, and error in exogenous inputs. 
Limitations in the precision of the transportation planning models caused by 
specification and calibration error pale in comparison to the uncertainty of fore-
casting exogenous inputs. How precise can we be in forecasting social and eco-
nomic factors 20 years into the future? 
Look ahead 20 years into the future and imagine what the United States will 
be like. Specifically, try to estimate the nation's population and employment 20 
years from now. Don't forget to account for factors such as future wars, major 
recessions, the reliability of crude oil supplies, U.S. immigration policy, and 
future fertility and death rates. 
"Now think about what Florida's share of your national estimate will be 20 
years in the future. Don't forget to account for the future fall of Castro, the 
political situation in Haiti, future national retirement locational preferences, po-
tential development moratoria, and supplies of potable water. 
Now that you have addressed all these factors and are confident with your 
estimates of U.S. and Florida's population and employment, think about what an 
individual county with Florida, e.g. Hillsborough County's, share will be 20 years 
from now. Be sure to account for factors such as the status of rebuilding the 
Tampa Interstate, the commercial success of the Florida Aquarium, competition 
by Orlando for tourists, and major corporate relocations. Now, allocate the 
Hillsborough County share across 800 traffic analysis zones. 
Seems like a pretty hopeless exercise, doesn't it?Yet, this is exactly what we 
do, every time we prepare a long range plan for an urbanized area. Moreover, 
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advocates of major capital investments routinely claim to be able to estimate 
traffic volumes or transit ridership 20 years into the future on individual links of 
a hypothetical transportation network. We develop plans as if we could take a 
rifle shot 20 years into the future and predict the precise magnitude and distribu-
tion of activities within a region. The reality is quite different-more like a shot-
gun blast. 
Examples of Forecast Performance 
It can be instructive to review examples of the past performance of trans-
portation forecasts to see just how accurate our forecasts have been. The ex-
amples presented in the following sections show that the track record of fore-
casts are not very reassuring. 
Tampa Urban Area Transportation Study. In 1970, a comprehensive urban 
area transportation study was undertaken for Tampa, which developed traffic 
forecasts for the year 1985 (Barr and Dunlop 1970). A comparison of the actual 
1985 traffic volumes was made with those forecasts made in 1970. Of 87 differ-
ent links for which it was possible to compare actual 1985 traffic counts with 
those forecasted in 1970, the errors ranged from -78 percent to +281 percent, 
with an average absolute link error of 57 percent. Moreover, these forecasts were 
for a 15-year period-insufficient by today's standards. 
Tampa CBD Employment Forecasts. During the early-to mid-l 980s, sev-
eral forecasts were prepared of future employment in the Tampa central business 
district (CBD). As illustrated in Figure 1, forecasts were done for a downtown 
people mover (DPM) study, for a central business district development of re-
gional impact (CBD ORI), and for several other conditions. Forecasts done in 
the early l 980s projected CBD employment to be at 75,000 to 80,000 by the year 
2000. In the mid-1980s, new forecasts were made. By then, it was clear that 
CBD employment was not on track to 80,000 by the year 2000; instead, it was 
forecast that employment would be in the 55,000 range by the year 2000, but 
would still be approaching 90,000 by the year 20 I 0. The reality is that, in the 
years since 1980, employment in the Tampa CBD has been fairly flat, falling in 
the 28,000-30,000 range in 1998. The range of forecasts and the actual perfor-
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Figure 1. Tampa CBD employment forecasts. 
mance demonstrate the extreme volatility of these model inputs, which, regretta-
bly, have been used as the basis for major capital facility planning in the region, 
including a downtown people mover system, a rail transit system, and a massive 
freeway construction program. 
Interstate Highway Estimates. An analysis of forecasts of traffic on urban 
interstates reported that traffic was overestimated by 21 percent and 24 percent, 
respectively, for three-and seven-year forecast periods (Pell and Mey berg 1983 ). 
The authors of the study concluded that " ... one of the most damning practical 
criticisms [ of the urban transportation planning process] is that the forecasts 
produced ... are incorrect." 
British Case Studies. The Transport and Road Research Laboratory pub-
lished a report (Mackinder and Evans 1981) in which forecasts from 44 British 
urban transportation studies undertaken between 1962 and 1971 were compared 
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with actual occurrences. On average, population was overestimated by 20 per-
cent and highway and public transit trips by 30 to 35 percent. If one were to 
measure the errors in forecasting the incremental change in various parameters, 
the results would be much worse: average forecasted population growth was 
three times the observed growth, while forecasts of the growth in total person 
trips were more than six times the observed growth. 
Guideway Transit Case Studies. Pickrell (1990) examined the accuracy of 
forecasts for eight U.S. cities that invested in rail transit projects. Forecasts of 
ridership and costs that were the basis of local decisions to implement these 
systems were compared with the actual costs and ridership experienced. Rider-
ship estimates were found to be consistently overestimated, while costs were 
consistentJy underestimated. The study noted that decisions to implement these 
major capital investments were made based on very small forecasted differences 
in performance between alternatives, whereas the actual performance of the se-
lected alternatives were substantially different from the forecasts. 
Misinterpretation a d Outright Bias 
in Individual and Group Decisionmaking 
The preceding section dealt with uncertainty and error primarily with re-
spect to the inability of models to replicate observed conditions. This section 
deals with our inability to interpret data correctly, and even more importantly, 
the pervasiveness of outright bias in the decisionmaking process. 
Common Errors in Individual Perception 
Perhaps the poor performance of transportation planning models should 
not be surprising, since our individual intuitive judgments regarding cause and 
effect are often flawed. In their best-selling book, In Search of Excellence, Peters 
and Waterman ( 1984) cite the work of psychologists Tversky and Kahneman 
(1974), and conclude that" ... people reason intuitively. They reason with simple 
decision rules, which is a simple way of saying that, in this complex world, they 
trust their ·gut." Unfortunately, gut feelings are not necessarily valid. 
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Most people attempt to discriminate much more than their knowledge war-
rants (Behn and Vaupel 1982). Perhaps the most significant example of indi-
vidual misperception is the comparative ase with which we can come up with 
after-the-fact explanations for events that we failed to predict (Fischoff 1977; 
Behn and Vaupel 1982; Hogarth 1987; Dawes 1988). When we reflect on a his-
torical occurrence, we search for reasons why it was entirely predictable, even 
though before the event itself the evidence was very confusing. 
Sodo-Political Bias in Forecasting and Dedsionmaking 
Given the difficulty we have as individuals, can it be any wonder that group 
decisions are even more confounding? Such errors are even more difficult to 
deal with, because they demonstrate not only our lack of individual ability to 
deal objectively with information but also with the bias introduced by conflict-
ing values. As observed by Ascher ( 1978), forecasts that underscore a priority 
that is out of political favor are likely to be ignored, whereas forecasts that sup-
port politically favorable positions are likely to be embraced. 
Reliance on Myth and Metaphor. In his provocative analysis of the decision 
to build a rail transit system in Los Angeles, Jonathan Richmond ( 1995) de-
scribes the process whereby myths are constructed through images, symbols, 
and metaphors, which provide compelling messages on what is good and bad in 
our world. He believes that a central feature of myth development is the focus on 
a tec}µlology that can serve as the center of attention, one of simplicity and 
certainty. Technology serves as a symbol; rather than deal with the complex 
myriad problems that need to be solved, technology allows us to focus on the 
"easy fix" to all of our problems. 
Making Forecasts Support Our Preconceptions. Too often our forecasts re-
flect what we desire, rather than what is likely to occur. As noted by the U.S. 
Department of Transportation and the Environmental Protection Agency, fore-
casted distributions of regional population and employment are often an errone-
ous input to the transportation planning models because of the influence of po-
litical compromise, rather than technical expertise (U.S. DOT 1993). Human 
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nature being what it is, we are more willing to entertain evidence that supports 
our view of the world and are resistant o contradictory evidence (Hogarth 1987). 
Ethics and Bias of Advocacy in Forecasting. Wachs ( 1986) relates tinkering 
with forecasts to the issue of professional ethics. He notes one study in which the 
models predicted "insufficient" rail ridership. To correct this situation, assumed 
highway speeds were reduced from 45 mph to a "more realistic" 30 mph. This 
simple assumption substantially increased the forecast of rail ridership. He notes 
that most of the forecasts used in planning of U.S. rail transit systems are state-
ments of advocacy, rather than unbiased estimates. 
Recommended Changes to the Urban lransportation Planning Process 
Our inability to control uncertainty dictates substantial changes in the way 
we do urban transportation planning. The assumption of a rational decisionmaking 
process th~t underlies current transportation practice does not exist. Rather, what 
has been observed is a technical process that is incapable of forecasting condi-
tions 20 years into the future and a political process that systematically and de-
liberately contrives forecasts to justify preconceptions of decisionmakers. 
In spite ofuncertainty, we need to plan for the future and to move proactively 
toward the attainment of valued goals. Moreover, we can adopt planning prac-
tices that reduce bias in our decisionmaking process. 
This section presents strategies considered to be most suitable for applica-
tion to urban transportation planning, along with specific actions needed to in-
corporate them into the process. 
Define a Strategic Vision 
The transportation planning process should begin by articulating a strategic 
vision. This would best be accomplished as part of a comprehensive strategic 
planning process. We need to be able to articulate a vision of what we want our 
community to be "when it grows up." 
The vision need not be a dramatic departure from the past. On the other 
hand, the·vision might call for sweeping changes to the character of the area. The 
vision will need to incorporate land use, community development, protection of 
Vol. 2, No. 1, 1998 
Journal of Public Transportation 35 
natural resources, and transportation. The vision will necessarily be strategic-it 
will incorporate the general desired features but will not rigidly define precise 
details, as these must be responsive to the unknowable future. 
Highlight Uncertainties through Strategic Planning 
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats. Once a strategic vision 
has been articulated, the recommended process would undertake a classical stra-
tegic planning approach that identifies strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and 
threats to reaching the desired vision. This activity represents a radical departure 
from traditional planning practice, which evaluates all available information to 
estimate a single expected value for each variable. The product of the strategic 
planning process should be an identification of all conceivable risks and a pro-
posed action for dealing with them. 
Highlight Uncertainties. A critical element of a new process should be the 
articulation of all assumptions and all uncertainties associated with forecasting 
future conditions. This practice will require a new awareness on the part of pro-
fessional staff of the importance of assumptions in the analytical process. How-
ever, it is vitally important that decisionmakers and the community be made 
fully aware of the uncertainties, particularly critical inputs to the transportation 
planning models: population, labor force, and employment. 
Scenario Analysis/Ranges of Assumptions. The strategic planning process 
should explicitly consider specific ranges of assumptions, as captured in alterna-
tive scenarios of the future. In spite of best available projections, what is the 
chance that study area population, labor force or employment will be IO percent 
higher or lower than the best guess estimate? Twenty percent higher? Errors of 
this magnitude need to be expected and anticipated. 
Promote Rexibility 
Once we admit the reality of uncertainty, flexibility becomes very impor-
tant. In a future that holds unanticipated surprises, we need to place a high value 
on retaining future options. 
Right-of Way Protection. One measure that could be implemented to pre-
serve future options and to emphasize flexibility is the early acquisition of trans-
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portation rights of way. While right-of-way preservation presents difficult politi-
cal challenges, the benefits make it worthwhile. 
Build-Later. The concept of a "build-later" alternative, as advocated by Chu 
and Polzin (1996), is recommended to be included in major investment studies. 
In contrast to current practice, in which end-states 20 or more years into the 
future are the basis for decisions today, the build-later alternative would result in 
the inclusion of major investment timing as an explicit analysis factor. 
Plan for Incremental Implementation 
Much of the research presented in this paper points toward the desirability 
of incremental implementation of major projects. One of the most controversial 
categories of transportation investments is the implementation of major fixed 
guideway transit projects, such as rail rapid transit systems. Risks and uncertain-
ties, particularly as they relate to future ridership and costs, have often made it 
impossible to muster the necessary political support to implement such systems, 
which are. typically represented in the form of optimistic assessments of out-
comes 20 to 50 years into the future. 
Can it be any surprise that elected officials are reluctant to commit to sys-
tems that will involve massive present costs in return for uncertain future ben-
efits? Because we make only grandiose plans, all we have to show is plans, while 
we might actually implement something one step at a time. Such an approach 
might begin by offering express bus service using makeshift park-and-ride lots. 
As demand increases, permanent and perhaps more ideally-located park-and-
ride facilities can be constructed. 
As warranted by demand, dedicated high occupancy vehicle (HOV) facili-
ties can be implemented or preferential bus treatments can be devised that allow 
buses to circumvent specific high congestion delay points. As each of these ac-
tions is taken, based on affirmation in the form of ridership, political support for 
the next increment of investment will build. Ultimately, the addition of a guide-
way transit system can be justified, with the park-and-ride infrastructure already 
in place. 
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Place Greater Emphasis on the Short Run. Uncertainty increases with du-
ration-not a major revelation, but, surprisingly, a fact that is frequently ignored. 
Regrettably, a condition of federal participation in projects has been assurance 
that improvements meet anticipated traffic levels 20 years following opening of 
the project. Moreover, this requirement will almost always negate the potential 
of systems and demand management actions as alternatives to major capital im-
provements. 
The focus of transportation planning on the 20-year horizon needs to be 
changed; instead, more emphasis should be placed on current deficiencies, and 
on the five-year horizon. Rather than focus on the development of a static plan 
for 20 years into the future, a dynamic process is recommended that identifies 
improvement needs in five-year increments. Initially, as suggested by Pickrell 
(1990), alternative actions for coping with immediate deficiencies should be 
evaluated. Following this, forecasts would be made of conditions at five-year 
increments into the future. The emphasis should be on selecting a good short 
term plan, to meet the needs of the initial five-year period, with a sequence of 
improvements _identified for each subsequent increment. In contrast to the cur-
rent process, which is predicated on optimizing the response to a highly uncer-
tain 20-year forecast, the recommended process is focused on optimizing re-
sponses in a shorter, five-year time frame, with an eye on the long term. 
Alternatives that Can be Implemented in Usable Modules. An example was 
provided of an alternative approach to the implementation of guideway transit 
systems. Rather than focusing on a system justified with forecasts of demand 
decades into the future, the alternative approach called for incremental imple-
mentation beginning with temporary park-and-ride lots, transitioning to HOV, 
ultimately resulting in guideway transit, if warranted. 
A modal alternative that merits much more consideration is that of exclu-
sive busway systems. A major advantage of a busway system is that, if properly 
staged, even small increments provide notable operational advantages. Each in-
crement offers improved levels of service for the bus system, contrasted with rail 
guideway alternatives, for which a substantial portion of the system must be 
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completed in order to achieve any benefits. A recent paper by Martinelli ( 1994) 
provides ample evidence of the benefits afforded by busways. He notes that the 
busway combines the flexibility of a bus to go anywhere with the line haul char-
acteristics of fixed guideway transit services, at substantially lower cost. The 
Ottawa and Pittsburgh exclusive busway systems are cited as examples of opera-
tional efficiency, the former carrying 210,000 passengers daily. 
A key feature of the busway alternative is that it can be implemented in 
increments, each of which provides measurable benefits. An important implica-
tion of uncertainty is that technologies that can be implemented in usable incre-
ments have an advantage. 
Promote Objectivity 
While the urban transportation planning process cannot (and should not) 
remove politics from decisionmaking, the process should promote the separa-
tion of politics from forecasting and impact analysis. The role-indeed, the ethi-
cal responsibility-of the transportation planner should be to provide objective 
analysis in a public forum that allows elected decisionmakers to make informed 
political tradeoffs. As those with experience in the process will attest, this is 
easier said than done. The specific recommendations of this and the next major 
section are designed to promote objectivity so that political tradeoffs are made 
based on our best available technical analysis. 
Incorporate Independent Peer Reviews. All ofus have experienced instances 
in which our close day-to-day participation in a project has blinded us to factors 
that are evident to outsiders. It is easy to get so involved in a project that we 
"cannot see the forest for the trees." 
It is recommended that the preparation of regional transportation plans, 
major corridor analyses, and major activity center studies incorporate a new 
task, an outside professional peer review. Effective peer reviews can serve as a 
check on basic input assumptions, technical procedures, demand forecasts, cost 
estimates, and the whole range of socio-political bias. Part of the task of the peer 
review would be to document uncertainties and assumptions (explicit and im-
plied). 
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The benefits of a peer review process can best be ensured if the peer panel 
is sponsored by an organization with a measure of independence from the study 
being reviewed. In the case of projects involving large sums of federal dollars, it 
might be appropriate if the cognizant federal agency assembles and retains a 
peer panel from outside the geographic region. At the state level, it might be 
appropriate for the state department of transportation to retain an outside peer 
panel as a condition of expending large sums of state dollars. 
Separate Planning from Implementation. One of the most obvious factors 
worki~g against objective development of capital improvements is conflict of 
interest of agencies and firms with a vested interest in capital intensive solu-
tions. In Florida, we have seen the creation of regional commuter rail authorities 
charged with studying and implementing commuter ail systems. What happens 
if objective study shows that a rail system is unwarranted? There is merit to the 
classical separation of regional planning and project implementation, as it re-
quires implementing agencies to have the endorsement of the metropolitan plan-
ning organization as a condition of project implementation. This requirement 
promotes comprehensive analysis of alternatives. 
Regrettably, we cannot always rely on professional consultants to evaluate 
objectively the feasibility of major capital projects when they have millions of 
dollars in design fees riding on a favorable decision. It is recommended that, 
when consulting firms are retained for technical assistance in evaluating alterna-
tives, conflict-of-interest considerations hould dictate that firms involved in the 
planning analysis be prohibited from a major role in the design contracts. While 
many consulting firms have a high degree of ethics and can be relied upon to 
exercise objective judgment without regard to future contracts, the motivations 
for bias are too strong to overlook. 
Place the Consequences of Risk with Decisionmakers 
When the bulk of the cost burden of major capital investments for a given 
locality is borne by others, there is little incentive to make careful decisions on 
resource commitments. This is particularly true of discretionary projects, and in 
the current vernacular, "demonstration projects," which translate to political ear-
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marking. An intelligent resource allocation system should be one in which the 
risks of aecepting optimistic forecasts of demand, cost, etc., are borne by the 
group making implementation decisions. A number of specific measures can 
support this recommendation. 
Broad Formula Grants. One measure that ISTEA promoted was to reduce 
the number of categorical imitations on application of federal funds. There is 
considerable merit to the allocation of federal and state support by means of 
broad formula grants that allow substantial ocal discretion as to which specific 
projects are undertaken, without regard to categorical limitations and differences 
in matching ratios. To the extent that local officials are required to allocate fixed 
funding amounts, the consequences of poor decisions would rest more squarely 
on local shoulders. If local decisions were poor, local areas would suffer, with no 
hope of state or federal bailout. 
Another alternative, suggested by Polzin ( 1995), would limit the federal 
commitment o major transit capital investments to a fixed amount per passen-
ger carried, thereby placing the risks of optimistic demand and cost estimates 
squarely on the shoulders of local decisionmakers. 
Increase Local Funding Responsibilities. Another measure is to reduce fed-
eral supp<1rt for local transportation investments, placing more of the funding 
burden on state and local agencies, which, in tum, are more dependent on local 
sources of tax support. Though the relative merits of shifting more responsibility 
for funding to the state and local level will be evaluated in the political arena, 
there can be little doubt that placing funding responsibility at the same level at 
which implementation decisions are made will hold local officials much more 
accountable for rational decisionmaking. 
Closing 
Uncertainty is pervasive in all of our planning activities. Yet, we plan as if 
we could take a snapshot 20 years into the future and devise an optimal solution 
to that snapshot. We ignore and even disguise the limitations of our methods and 
fail to develop contingencies for the uncertainties that may arise. 
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It is believed that the implementation of the approaches outlined in this 
paper will allow us to recognize uncertainty, yet not be paralyzed by it; to move 
proactively toward the attainment of valued societal objectives, yet be prepared 
for the changes we cannot predict. •:• 
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